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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD S. SWART, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20000814-CA 
Priority No. ? 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner appeals from an order denying his motion for relief from a judgment 
denying his petition for post-conviction relief. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the district court properly deny petitioner's motion seeking relief from the 
order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief? 
Standard of Review. A motion for relief from a judgment or order under rule 60(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, f 9,2 P.3d 451; accord Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 
205,206 (Utah 1998). 
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2. Where this Court has already dismissed petitioner's appeal of an order denying 
the petition for post-conviction relief, is petitioner's challenge to that order in this appeal 
properly before the Court? 
Standard of Review. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear a claim on appeal is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 870 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that "whether jurisdiction exists 
presents a question of law, which [the Court] review[s] for correctness"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The interpretation of rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is relevant to a 
determination of this case. That rule provides: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or 
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
On December 10, 1993, petitioner, with the advice of counsel, Brad Rich, entered 
pleas of no contest to two counts of forcible sexual abuse, both second degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1990). R. 128-36; see also R. 137-68 (plea hearing 
transcript). The pleas were made pursuant to a plea bargain in which one of the two counts 
was reduced from a first degree felony to a second degree felony. R. 131,136. On January 
24, 1994, sentenced petitioner to serve concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years. R. 
169-70; see also R. 171-96 (sentencing transcript). Nothing in the record suggests that 
petitioner ever moved to withdraw his plea or otherwise appealed his sentence.1 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Almost six months after sentencing, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. See R. 972. The district court denied the petition and the court of appeals affirmed 
the denial on appeal. See R. 972; Case No. 940621-CA. The Utah Supreme Court denied 
the petition for a writ of certiorari. See R. 972; Case No. 950195-SC. 
*Nearly eighteen months after sentencing, petitioner filed a pro se "Motion for 
Orders to Expunge Records, Produce Records, and Complete a New Presentence 
Investigation Report," claiming, in part, that he had received information that his attorney 
had not fully investigated his case. R. 197-206. The trial court denied the motion. R. 
207-08. 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Grounds for Relief. In September, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for relief under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to-110 (1996), and rule 65C, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 1-5. Petitioner alleged, among other things, that (1) his 
trial counsel, Brad Rich, did not adequately investigate the case because he did not obtain 
certain psychological records of the victim from Benchmark Regional Hospital, (2) petitioner 
did not have enough information to make an informed plea, and (3) Rich coerced him into 
accepting the plea bargain. R. 2, 18-22. After reviewing the petition, the sentencing judge 
ordered the State to respond. R. 112. 
Motions to Dismiss Petition. The State moved to dismiss the petition for failure to file 
within the one-year statute of limitations period provided under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-
107(1996). R. 117,209-24. The district court agreed, dismissing the petition. R. 254,257-
62. Petitioner appealed and the court of appeals reversed, relying on State v. Frausto, 966 
P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). R. 263, 357-60; Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96, 976 P.2d 100. 
In July, 1999, the State filed a second motion to dismiss the petition. R. 418-19. The 
State argued that the petition was procedurally barred under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 
(1996). R. 424-33. The State argued that the petition should in any event be denied because 
the record demonstrated a knowing and voluntary plea and petitioner failed to adequately 
allege a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 434-52. 
Evidentiary Hearing and Ruling. On September 20th and 28th, 1999, the district court 
held an evidentiary hearing on the merits of petitioner's post-conviction claims. R. 617-18, 
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621. Some three months later, after receiving written summations from both parties, the 
district court issued a memorandum decision denying the petition. R. 632-99, 807-52; R. 
853-61. On March 6, 2000, the district court signed and entered the order of dismissal, 
which included findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 971-83.2 
Motion for Relief from Judgment. On May 1,2000, petitioner moved for relief from 
judgment, claiming that Rich's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was perjured. See R. 
1031-68; see also R. 1104-05. To support that claim, petitioner also sought to supplement 
the record with the affidavit of Ray Singley—a therapist who had treated petitioner, 
additional records from Benchmark Regional Hospital, and a copy of a bar complaint 
petitioner had filed against Rich. R. 1031-68. In a minute entry, the district court granted 
petitioner's motion to supplement the record, but denied his motion for relief from the order 
of dismissal. R. 1111-12. On September 12,2000, the district court entered a written order 
to that effect. R. 1432-33.3 The court explained that while Singley's affidavit raised "some 
concern" regarding Rich's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, that testimony "was by no 
means determinative in this case and indeed, played little or no part in the Court's decision." 
R. 1111. 
2The district court rejected petitioner's subsequent objections to the order of 
dismissal. R. 1010-11, 1020-27, 1457-58. 
3The minute entry and corresponding order are reproduced in Addendum A. 
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Appeals. On June 7,2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal challenging the district 
court's order of dismissal entered March 6, 2000. R. 1118.4 On September 19, 2000, 
petitioner filed a second notice of appeal, now before this Court, challenging the district 
court's order of dismissal and the "denial of his post-judgment motions, which were entered 
on September 12, 2000." R. 1452-53, 1459. The State moved to dismiss both appeals as 
untimely. SeeR. 1512-13, 1522-23. 
Concluding that the first appeal challenging the order of dismissal was not timely 
filed, this Court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R. 1522-23; Swart v. State, 
2001 UT App 2 (reproduced in Addendum B). The Supreme Court denied petitioner's 
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Swart v. State, Docket No. 20010209-SC (Utah June 20, 
2001). This Court denied the State's motion to dismiss the second appeal, concluding that 
"the appeal is timely insofar as it is taken from the denial of a motion under rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." R. 1513 (reproduced in Addendum C).5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for relief 
from the order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner claimed that his trial 
counsel's testimony at the post-conviction hearing was perjured. However, petitioner offered 
4In his notice of appeal, petitioner alleged that the final order of dismissal was 
entered on May 30, 2000, rather than March 6, 2000, the date it was signed and file 
stamped. SeeR. 971-81. 
Petitioner has since filed with the district court a "Motion for Setting Aside of 
Court's Order Dismissing Petition for Extraordinary Relief on the Basis of Fraud and 
Perjury." R. 1637-39. The district court has not addressed that motion. 
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no evidence to substantiate that claim. Moreover, whether or not counsel spoke with the 
therapist was not a factor in the district court's denial of the petition for post-conviction 
relief. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief under rule 60(b) even if the claim of 
perjury were substantiated because that testimony was not a basis for the district court's 
order. 
Petitioner's challenge to the order denying post-conviction relief is not properly before 
the Court. Petitioner's appeal of the denial was dismissed for failure to timely appeal. 
Petitioner cannot now challenge the underlying merits of that denial in an appeal on a motion 
for relief from judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE ORDER 
DISMISSING HIS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Petitioner seeks reversal of the district court's denial of his motion for relief from the 
court's order denying post-conviction relief. See Aplt. Brf. at 18-22.6 Petitioner's motion 
is treated as a motion under rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 1513.7 
6The district court treated petitioner's "Motion to Supplement Record and for 
Relief from Order/Judgment" as two separate motions: a "Motion to Supplement [the] 
Record" and a "Motion for Relief from Ruling or Order [Denying Post-Conviction 
Relief]." See R. 1432-33 (emphasis in original). Because the district court granted the 
motion to supplement the record, petitioner only challenges the trial court's denial of his 
motion for relief from the order denying post-conviction relief. 
7On the State's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely, this Court ruled that "the 
appeal is timely insofar as it is taken from the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) of the 
7 
Petitioner did not identify in his motion the grounds upon which he sought relief from 
the order, but merely asked that the district court "reconsider and grant relief from the 
dismissal "[t]o the extent that the record supplementation [so] persuades the Court." R. 
1032; see also R. 1067. The gravamen of petitioner's rule 60(b) motion appears to be a claim 
that petitioner's trial counsel gave perjured testimony at the post-conviction hearing. In 
support of this allegation, petitioner submitted an affidavit by Ray Singley, a mental health 
counselor who had provided counseling to petitioner before his conviction. See R. 1033-35. 
In that affidavit, Singley stated that contrary to Rich's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, 
he did not recall ever speaking with Rich concerning petitioner. R. 1034. The district court 
acknowledged that the affidavit created "some concern to the Court," but denied the motion 
for relief because "the testimony of Mr. Rich regarding his conversations with Mr. Singley 
was by no means determinative in this case and indeed, played little or no part in the Court's 
decision." R. 1111.8 Petitioner appeals that decision. See Aplt. Brf. at 18-22. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Order Denying Motion to Consolidate and to Dismiss 
Second Appeal, Dec. 19, 2000 (R. 1513). 
Petitioner has not challenged on appeal the trial court's conclusion that his bar 
complaint against Mr. Rich and the victim's Benchmark records did not provide a basis 
for relief from the order of dismissal. See Aplt. Brf. at 18-24. The bar complaint was 
nothing more than a reiteration of petitioner's grievances against his trial counsel. See R. 
1036-44. Moreover, and as noted by the district court, the records from Benchmark 
Regional Hospital had previously been submitted to the court at the post-conviction 
hearing. See R. 1111; compare R. 1045-65 with Plaintiffs Exhibits 13 and 15; see also 
R. 65-72. Information already before the court provides no basis for relief under rule 
60(b). See Murdock v. Springville Municipal Corp., 1999 UT 39, f 23, 982 P.2d 65 
(holding that submission of information identical to that which has been previously 
admitted does not constitute newly discovered evidence and thus provides no basis for a 
rule 60(b) motion). 
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A. ESTABLISHING FRAUD UNDER RULE 60(B). 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Petitioner's claim of perjury raises a claim of intrinsic fraud. See St. 
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982) (observing that "false testimony during 
the trial" falls under the rubric of intrinsic fraud).9 To prevail on a claim of perjury, it is not 
enough simply to show contradictions in trial testimony. See State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 
24-25 (Utah 1984) (holding that "mere inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness 
for the prosecution is not enough to constitute perjury"). "There must be some palpable 
contradiction or untruth." Id. at 25. 
Moreover, rule 60(b) permits relief only "in the furtherance of justice." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b). Thus, a movant is not entitled to relief unless the alleged fraud had an adverse 
impact on the proceedings. See Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989) 
(finding that husband's claim for relief from a stipulated judgment dividing marital assets to 
be without merit because his wife's alleged misrepresentations "would not have been a 
legitimate factor in determining a division of the parties' property"); see also St. Pierre, 645 
9The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud was once significant because 
courts allowed relief from extrinsic fraud, but not intrinsic fraud. See St. Pierre, 645 P.2d 
at 618. Utah now recognizes that relief may be obtained in either case. Id. at 618-19. 
9 
P.2d at 618 (holding that "[intrinsic fraud refers to matters occurring during the course of 
the proceedings . . . which may have influenced the judgment1'). 
A review of the record reveals that the district court correctly denied petitioner's 
motion for relief. 
B. PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS CLAIM OF PERJURY. 
Petitioner failed in the first instance to substantiate his allegation of perjury. At the 
post-conviction hearing, Singley testified that he had "no memory" of Rich contacting him. 
R. 1702: 77. On the other hand, Rich testified that he spoke with Singley on two or three 
occasions. R. 1703:281; 310-11. According to Rich, Singley confirmed in those discussions 
that petitioner was a pedophile and had admitted to pedophelic behavior with several 
patients. R. 1703: 281. On cross-examination, Rich could not account for the difference in 
their testimonies, but reaffirmed his testimony on direct, maintaining that he and Singley 
"talked on multiple occasions." R. 1703:311. 
In support of his claim that Rich's testimony was perjured, petitioner offered the 
affidavit of Singley. That affidavit, however, fell short of substantiating petitioner's claim 
of perjury. Singley simply reaffirmed his trial testimony. See R. 1034: f^ 5 (asserting that he 
"did not recall ever having spoken to [petitioner's] attorney, Brad Rich . . . .") and ^ 6 
(alleging that Rich's testimony was false). In an effort to bolster his credibility, Singley 
added that a review of his telephone records found no evidence of a conversation with Rich. 
R. 1034: \ 8. This is insufficient. Singley did not submit the telephone records, nor did he 
identify what kinds of telephone records he kept, under what circumstances he kept telephone 
10 
records, or what information he included. Moreover, Singley's assertion that he "did a fairly 
exhaustive review" of his telephone records suggests that it was not a complete review. See 
R. 1034:18. In short, the affidavit upon which petitioner relied to establish perjury offered 
no substantiation of that claim—the question remained a "he said, he said" proposition.10 As 
provided under Utah's perjury laws, a false statement under oath "may not be established 
solely through contradiction by the testimony of a single witness." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
505(1) (1999). Because petitioner failed to demonstrate that Rich made a false statement, 
his was not entitled to relief from the judgment. 
Petitioner contends on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion for 
relief because it failed to "conduct a threshold inquiry to determine whether perjury had in 
fact been committed" as alleged in his motion. Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. He argues that this was 
error because a finding of perjury would have necessarily entitled him to relief from the order 
of dismissal. Aplt. Brf. at 20-22. However, petitioner did not request an evidentiary hearing, 
but asked for relief based on the record supplementation only. See R. 1032, 1067. In fact, 
petitioner filed a notice to submit the motion for decision ten days after filing the motion. 
R. 1098. He cannot now complain on appeal that no hearing was held. See Lopez v. Shulsen, 
10Indeed, while Singley denied speaking with either Rich or his predecessor Ron 
Yengich, R. 1702: 77-78, Yengich's notes suggested that he did speak with Singley. R. 
1703: 223. Yengich testified that according to one note, Singley told Yengich that 
petitioner likely "did it." R. 1703: 226. That note was apparently part of Plaintiff s 
Exhibit 10, but the record inexplicably only includes one page of that exhibit. 
Moreover, Rich's remarks at the sentencing hearing confirm his testimony at the 
post-conviction hearing that he spoke with Singley. See Transcript of Sentencing (part of 
record, but not indexed), p. 6 ("I have discussed this with his therapist on the west 
coast-Ray Singley-at great length."). 
11 
716 P.2d 787, 789 (Utah 1986) (holding that "[f|amiliar rules of appellate review preclude 
an issue being raised for the first time on appeal except under exceptional circumstances"). 
C. THE ALLEGED PERJURED TESTIMONY WAS NOT A FACTOR IN THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S DECISION. 
Even assuming for argument's sake that Rich did not testify truthfully, petitioner's 
claim still fails. As explained above, a movant is not entitled to relief from the judgment 
unless the false testimony adversely affected the judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Birch, 
771 P.2d at 1117; St. Pierre, 645 P.2d at 618. In ruling on the petition for post-conviction 
relief, the district court made "no finding as to whether [trial counsel's] conduct fell below 
the required standard" for effective assistance of counsel. R. 855,979. The court thus held 
that trial counsel's testimony regarding his investigation, and particularly "his conversations 
with Mr. Singley[,] was by no means determinative." R. 1111. The district court instead 
denied the petition for post-conviction relief because petitioner did "not establish[ ] that any 
deficient performance prejudiced his defense." R. 979; see also R. 855-56. Accordingly, 
petitioner's claim that his trial counsel falsely testified has no conceivable impact on the 
judgment because the district court did not deny his petition based on counsel's performance, 
but rather on the determination that any alleged deficiency in investigation did not prejudice 
petitioner.11 
11
 As revealed at the post-conviction hearing, Rich and his predecessor in fact 
conducted significant investigation. They obtained discovery from the prosecutor, R. 
1703: 247, interviewed the victim, R. 1702: 164; R. 1703: 247, spoke at length with 
petitioner, R. 1703: 248, spoke to other witnesses, including Dr. LaPray, R. 1703: 257, 
obtained information about the victim from Psychological Associates, R. 1703: 258, 
arranged for petitioner to view a photograph of the victim, R. 1703: 251-53, and, contrary 
12 
Moreover, the information provided by Singley was not useful to a defense. At the 
post-conviction hearing, Singley testified he diagnosed petitioner in part with pedophelia. 
R. 1702: 81, 84-86. He indicated that petitioner had related his involvement in at least one 
inappropriate incident. R. 1702: 73, 87. He testified that he provided counseling to 
petitioner for his pedophelia and other problems for almost three years leading up to 
petitioner's incarceration. See R. 1702: 73, 84-86. Notwithstanding that therapy, Singley 
testified that pedophelia was still part of his diagnosis for petitioner. R. 1702: 88. Although 
Singley also expressed his belief that petitioner was not acting out his pedophelia and was 
progressing in his therapy, R. 1702: 79, 89, those opinions would have done little to assist 
the defense if introduced at a trial. 
Finally, this information could have no conceivable impact on petitioner's decision 
to enter the plea agreement. As the patient, he was well aware of his therapy with Singley. 
See R. 1703: 209, 212-13. Accordingly, even assuming Rich had not spoken with Singley, 
that would have had no effect on petitioner's decision to enter a plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 
474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985) (holding that "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' 
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial"). 
to petitioner's claim, spoke with his therapist, R. 1703: 281-82. 
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II. 
PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
UNDERLYING ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT 
In his final claim, petitioner contends that his petition for post-conviction relief should 
have been granted because his trial counsel suffered from a conflict of interest which 
adversely affected petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Brf. at 23. 
That claim is a direct challenge to the district court's order denying the petition for post-
conviction relief. Because the appeal here is not an appeal from the district court's denial 
of post-conviction relief, but rather from an order denying relief from the denial, review of 
petitioner's claim is not subject to review by this Court. 
Fifty-six days after the district court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, 
petitioner filed a "Motion to Supplement Record and for Relief from Order/Judgment." R. 
1031-32. Thirty-seven days later—93 days after the post-conviction denial, petitioner also 
initiated appellate review of the post-conviction denial by filing a notice of appeal. See R. 
971-83, 1118. While that appeal was still pending, the district court granted the motion to 
supplement the record. R. 1432. However, petitioner's motion for relief from the 
order—which the district court treated as a rule 59 and 60(b) motion, was denied. R. 1432-
33. The court explained that it was "not persuaded that the Record as supplemented justifies 
the granting of his petitioner's post-judgment relief, or that its prior ruling denying post-
conviction relief should be altered or amended." R. 1433. One week later on September 19, 
2000, petitioner filed another notice of appeal. R. 1452-53,1459. In that notice, petitioner 
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again purported to appeal the district court's order denying his petition for post-conviction 
relief. R. 1452. He also appealed the district court's refusal to grant his motion seeking 
relief from the order denying post-conviction relief. See R. 1452.12 Therefore, as of 
September 19, 2000, this Court had before it two appeals arising from the same case. 
In the first appeal, petitioner sought "reversal of the trial court's denial of his petition 
for post-conviction relief." R. 1522; Swart v. State, 2001 UT App 2. However, the State 
moved for summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. R. 1522; Swart v. State, 2001 UT App 
2. This Court agreed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was filed more 
than 30 days after the district court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. R. 1522; 
Swart, 2001 UT App 2. The Court also held that petitioner had not filed any timely post-
judgment motions that would otherwise extend the appeal period. R. 1522-22 A; Swart, 2001 
UT App 2. Accordingly, petitioner's first appeal, which challenged the order dismissing the 
petition for post-conviction relief, was dismissed. R. 1522A; Swart, 2001 UT App 2. 
The State also moved to dismiss the second appeal, which is the appeal now before 
this Court, on the ground that it too was untimely. See R. 1512. The Court observed that "an 
order denying a Rule 60(b) motion is itself final and appealable." R. 1512. Because the 
notice of appeal was filed just seven days after the district court's order denying relief from 
the judgment, the Court denied the State's motion to dismiss this second appeal "insofar as 
12The notice of appeal indicates that petitioner was appealing the "denial of his 
post-judgment [sic] motions, which were entered on September 12, 2000." R. 1452. The 
September 12th order of the district court granted petitioner's motion to supplement the 
record, but denied petitioner's motion for relief from the order denying the petition for 
post-conviction relief. SeeR. 1432-33. 
15 
it is taken from the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." R. 1513. This Court later "reminded [petitioner] that this case, pursuant to the 
court's order of December 19, 2000, is timely only insofar as it is taken from denial of a 
motion under rule 60(b)." Order dated January 23, 2001 (reproduced in Addendum D). 
As the foregoing proceedings make clear, the scope of this appeal is limited to the 
district court's denial of petitioner's rule 60(b) motion for relief from the order denying the 
post-conviction petition. Petitioner's final claim, seeking reversal of the district court's order 
denying post-conviction relief, is thus beyond the scope of this appeal. Indeed, as this Court 
has already held, the Court lacks jurisdiction to address any challenge to the district court's 
order denying the petition for post-conviction relief. R. 1522-22A. The Court could not 
then, and cannot now, take jurisdiction over an appeal "which is not timely brought before 
i t " Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982). 
Moreover, rule 60(b) is not a mechanism to review the underlying merits of the order 
from which relief is sought. As this Court recently held: 
"An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or 
grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of 
the underlying judgment from which relief was sought. Appellate review of 
Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest Rule 60(b) become a 
substitute for timely appeals. An inquiry into the merits of the underlying 
judgment or order must be the subject of a direct appeal from that judgment or 
order." 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, \ 19,2 P.3d 451 (quoting 12 
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999)(emphasis in 
original). 
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Relief from an order may be granted under rule 60(b) only for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Petitioner simply challenges the district court's denial of his petition, 
claiming that it should have granted post-conviction relief because of an alleged conflict of 
interest. Aplt. Brf. at 23. Such a challenge does not fall within one of the six enumerated 
categories, even under that which permits relief for "mistake." Franklin Covey, 2000 UT 
App 110, at f 22 (holding that "[i]f a court merely wrongly decided a point of law, that is not 
[mistake], inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.") (internal quotes and citations 
omitted). 
Like the appellant in Franklin Covey, petitioner here "has attempted to use Rule 60(b) 
as a 'back door' to a direct appeal of the underlying judgment[ ]" after having failed to timely 
appeal that judgment. Id. at ^ f 23. This he cannot do. Accordingly, this Court should reject 
petitioner's attempt to present for review issues that would only have been properly before 
the Court on a direct, timely appeal from the order denying post-conviction relief. See id. at 
25. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
district court's order denying relief from the judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this (Q day of November, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEpREY S. GRAY y 
''ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the [ 3 day of November, 2001,1 served two copies of the 
attached Brief of Appellee upon the petitioner/appellant, Richard S. Swart, by causing them 
to be delivered via first class mail, postage prepaid, to him as follows: 
Richard S. Swart 
ProSe 
P.O. Box 550 
Gunnison, UT 84634 
JefftJy'S. Gray ^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
T -d Ju< .11 District 
MW I 9 2000, 
*AA ] Deputy Cleric 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD SWART, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASS NO. 970906919 
The Court has reviewed the Motion to Supplement the Record and 
for Relief from Order and Judgment. 
The Court grants the Motion to Supplement the Record and 
denies the Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment. 
At the time of the Court's decision, the Court had before it 
the medical records referred to in the Motion to Supplement the 
Record. 
The filing of a Bar complaint against Mr. Rich is not 
something that would persuade the Court to change its decision. 
The Affidavit of Ray Singley is, of course, of some concern to 
the Court and may or may not be a key issue in the complaint before 
the Bar, however, the testimony of Mr. Rich regarding his 
conversations with Mr. Singley was by no means determinative in 
this case and indeed, played little or no part in the Court's 
decision. 
001111 
SWART V. STATE PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
Counsel is to^prepare an appropriate Order. 
Dated this [ day of May, 2000. / 
<r^n 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
SWART V. STATE PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this |^V day of May, 
2000: 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorney for Petitioner 
6550 Emerald, Suite 108 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
0 0111 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Mitchell R. Barker SEP t 2 2000 
Utah Bar # 4530 £v
 SALT LM(E C0UNTy 
Idaho #6033 »_££ 
Attorney for Petitioner u Deputy Clerk 
6550 West Emerald, #108 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Telephone (208) 375-9392 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE O F UTAH 
RICHARD S. SWART, ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO 
Petitioner, SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
AND DENYING POST-
vs. JUDGMENT MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM 
STATE OF UTAH, ORDER OR JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970906919RN 
Respondent. 
Comes before the Court the motion of Petitioner Richard Swart to supplement the trial record 
in this matter, as amended, along with his motion for relief from the Ruling of dismissal of the Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief in this matter. 
The motion was filed with the Court on May 1, 2000, and was supplemented on May 4, 
2000. It having been fully briefed, the Court entered its Minute Entry on May 19, 2000, ruling upon 
both motions. The Court having considered the memoranda of the parties, and good cause appearing, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. Petitioner's Motion to Supplement Record is granted. 
2. The Court is not persuaded that the Record as supplemented justifies the granting of 
his petitioner's post-judgment motion for relief, or that its prior Ruling denying post-
conviction relief should be altered or amended. 
Accordingly, Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Ruling or Order, which is deemed to be 
under both Rule 60(b) URCP and 59 URCP, is denied. 
SO ORDERED this / t? -day of September, 2000. 
BYTHEC( 
Honorable Fr; 
Presiding Judgi 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the 4th day of September, 2000,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing, by postage prepaid mail, to: 
Erin Riley, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Mitchell R. Barker 
September 4, 2000 
Honorable Frank Noel 
Presiding Judge 
Third District Court 
P.O. Box 1860 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Richard Swart v. State of Utah 
Habeas Corpus, Case #970906919 
(Appeal # 20000511-CA) 
Dear Judge Noel: 
In the case of Richard Swart, which is on appeal, a review of the Docket in this 
Court reveals two items which I appear to have overlooked. They are as follows: 
1. It appears that, despite my recent letter to you, I have failed to date to 
issue a Notice to Submit for Decision on my motion that the government 
be required to pay for transcripts of the September 1999 trial in this 
matter. That Notice to Submit is filed on this date, so that motion can be 
wrapped up. 
2. Of even more importance is that I apparently never submitted until now a 
proposed Order on your ruling granting my April 28th motion to 
supplement the record and for relief from the judgment. You granted the 
first and denied the second parts of that motion, and I was to prepare the 
order. I apologize for not having done so. Since the State is trying hard to 
achieve dismissal of the appeal based on the claim that you did not have 
6550 E M E R A H P H O T &W§ F© N O i l o 1 s E , ID 83704 P H O N E 2 0 8 / 3 7 5 / 9 3 9 2 F A X 2 0 8 / 3 7 W 2 4 0 3 T O L L F R E E 80*0 '4 1 2 / 4 6 ^ ; 
N A M P A / C A L D W E L L 4 6 7 / 9 3 9 2 O N T A R I O 8 8 1 / 8 8 0 9 P A Y E T T E 6 4 2 / 9 2 9 0 M T H O M E 387/2388 M L C \ L L 6 ^ 4 / 4 4 1 0 
authority to extend our appeal time as you recently were kind enough to 
do, this Order coming now is important. 
Enclosed, therefore, is a proposed order. I am simultaneously sending a copy to 
Erin Riley of the attorney general's office. Please wait eight days to allow 
objection pursuant to the UCJA, and then sign it if it appears appropriate. An 
extra copy and self addressed envelope are enclosed. I would appreciate Pat 
conforming a copy of the order and sending it back to me. If there are errors or 
corrections, please let me know. 
Thank you for your assistance in this important step. 
Copy: R. Swart, Erin Riley, Esq. 
Enclosure 
Honorable F. Noel 2 
Addendum B 
A AAtmA^™ TX 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Richard S. Swart, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
FILED , 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 0 5 2001 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
%> 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
Case No. 200.00511-CA 
P I L E D 
(January 5, 2001) 
2001 UT App 2 
^Ho^OM/ef 
Third District, Salt Lake Division 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: Richard S. Swart, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
Jan Graham, Erin Riley, and Laura DuPaix, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Thome. 
PER CURIAM: 
The State moved for summary disposition of this appeal on 
the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction because 
petitioner's notice of appeal was not timely filed. Petitioner 
seeks summary reversal of the trial court's denial of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of 
the judgment or order appealed from which the appeal is taken. 
The trial court's order dismissing petitioner's request for post-
conviction relief was entered on March 6, 2000. His notice of 
appeal was filed on June 7, 2000. When a notice of appeal is 
filed beyond the 30 days allowed by Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a), this court does not have jurisdiction to consider 
an appeal. See, e.g.. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 P.2d 1230 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 
1981). This rule applies whether or not an appellant has 
received notice that a final order has been entered. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 58A(c) and (d). 
Petitioner suggests that the time for filing his appeal was 
tolled by both his filing of objections to the trial court's 
findings, conclusions and order and the trial court's grant of 
his motion for extension of time to file his appeal. We note 
that the objections were not filed within 10 days of the trial 
court's order, as required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) 
and 59(b), Untimely post-judgment motions do not toll the time 
for appeal. See, e.g., Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 
(Utah 1982) (per curiam); Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 133 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Additionally, petitioner made his motion 
for extension of time to file the appeal beyond the time allowed 
for such motions by rule 4(e). Since the motion was untimely, 
the trial court did not have power to extend the time for filing. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the appeal is 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because we dismiss the case, 
we do not consider the merits of other pending motions in this 
appeal. 
^ 9 - ^ K> 
Famela T. Greenwood,- ^ Pamela T 
Presidin 
Greenwood,-
Judge 
**~r 
William Thome, Jr, 
20000511-CA 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January, 2001, a true and 
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in 
the United States mail to: 
RICHARD S. SWART 
PO BOX 250 
DRAPER UT 84020 
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION 
was hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney 
General's Office to be delivered to: 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ERIN RILEY and LAURA DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION 
was deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed 
below: 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Judicial Secretary 
TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 970906919 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20000511-CA 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILER 
DEC 1* 
Richard S. Swart, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
CONSOLIDATE AND TO DISMISS 
SECOND APPEAL 
Case No. 20000511-CA 
Case No. 2000814-CA 
These cases are before the court on appellant Richard 
Swart!s motion to consolidate appeals, which is opposed by the 
State, and on the State1s motion to dismiss the appeal in Case 
No. 20000814-CA. 
The appeal in Case No. 20000511-CA was taken from the 
March 6, 2000 order dismissing Swartfs petition for post-
conviction relief. On May 1, 2000, Swart filed a Motion to 
Supplement Record and for Relief from Judgment. On June 7, 
2000, he filed a notice of appeal from the order dismissing the 
petition. In an order entered on September 12, 2000, the 
district court granted the motion to supplement, but denied the 
motion for relief from judgment, which it "deemed to be under 
both Rule 60(b) URCP and 59 URCP." Swart filed a notice of 
appeal from this order on September 19, 2000. 
The State contends that the motion for relief from 
judgment was untimely under either Rule 59 or Rule 52 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and cannot extend the time for 
appeal from the order dismissing the post-conviction petition. 
This is precisely the issue before the court in the separate 
motion to dismiss pending in Case No. 20000511-CA. In 
contrast, the "second" appeal in Case No. 20000814-CA was 
timely filed within thirty days after entry of the order 
denying the motion for relief from judgment. In its motion to 
dismiss the second appeal, the State fails to acknowledge that 
an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion is itself final and 
appealable. See, e.g.. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Based upon the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to consolidate the 
appeals is denied, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal 
in Case No. 2000814-CA is denied because the appeal is timely 
insofar as it is taken from the denial of a motion under Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This order shall 
have no effect on the pending motion to dismiss the appeal in 
Case No. 20000511-CA. 
Dated this /gx^-day of December, 2000. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
20000814-CA 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on December 20, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
RICHARD S. SWART ASPEN 104-T 22728 
CENTRAL UTAH CORRECTIONAL 
PO 550 
GUNNISON UT 84634 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
Dated this December 20, 2000. 
By W/^4S -}/fr.jfc£„? 
Deputy Clerg) (r 
Case No. 20000814-CA 
0 « , 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on December 20, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
ERIN RILEY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
MITCHELL R. BARKER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
6550 EMERALD #108 
BOISE ID 83704 
Dated this December 20, 2000. 
By ^ckfr££< -7>^W*#0 
Deputy Cle 
Case No. 20000511-CA 
Addendum D 
A^HpnHnm F) 
N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED , 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 2 3 2001 
PaidettB Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Respondent and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard S. Swart, 
Petitioner and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 20000814-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion, 
filed January 12, 2001, for enlargement of time to file summary 
disposition motion, or in the alternative, to incorporate the 
summary disposition motion filed in Case 20000511 as having been 
filed in this case. 
Appellant is advised that case no. 20000511-CA was dismissed 
by memorandum decision issued on January 5, 2001. Further, 
appellant is reminded that this case, pursuant to the court's 
order of December 19, 2000, is timely only insofar as it is taken 
from denial of a motion under Rule 60 (b) . 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant is granted an extension 
of time of thirty (30) days from the date of this order to file a 
motion for summary disposition in this case. FURTHER, IT IS 
ORDERED that appellant's alternative request for this court to 
consider the motion for summary disposition filed in case no. 
20000511-CA as also being filed in this case is denied. 
Dated this 2 3 day of January, 2001. 
FOR THE COURT: 
William A. Thorne, Jr 
